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INTRODUCTION 
The Original Participating Manufacturers (OPMs) want this Court to view this appeal as 
being "about the power of the courts." OPMs' Brief, p. 1. It is not. This appeal is about whether 
arbitrators may act without what courts call "jurisdiction" and what arbitration statutes positively 
call the arbitrators' "powers" or negatively describe as "matter[ s] not submitted to [ the 
arbitrators]." Federal and Idaho arbitration statutes provide for trial courts to vacate or modify 
arbitration awards "where the arbitrators exceeded their powers" and/or "awarded upon a matter 
not submitted to them." 10 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4), § l l(b); Idaho Code§ 7-912(a)(3), § 7-913(a)(2). 
The OPMs and SPMs (Subsequent Participating Manufacturers) argue that the District 
Court had no authority to consider Idaho's Motion to Vacate in Part the "extra-jurisdictional" 
parts of the arbitrators' Partial Award; they argue that Idaho lacks standing to move to vacate be-
cause it will lose on the merits. Their argument turns standing on its head. As shown in Idaho's 
briefing to this Court, the PMs are in error with respect to both Idaho's standing and the merits. 
As further shown in Idaho's briefing, the arbitrators decided issues as to Idaho that Idaho 
never agreed to arbitrate. Idaho was harmed both procedurally (the wrong forum decided 
Idaho's issues concerning what the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) provides and whether 
the Term Sheet affected Idaho) and substantively (the arbitrators' Partial Award displaced the 
MSA and violated Idaho's contract rights under the MSA). Idaho thus has standing to pursue 
both its procedural and substantive claims and is entitled to prevail on the merits. 
REPLY TO THE OPMS' AND SPMS' STATEMENTS OF THE CASE 
A. REPLY TO THE OPMs' NATURE OF THE CASE 
The OPMs state that Idaho objects to the arbitrators' implementing post-2003 Term Sheet 
provisions among the Settling Parties, not by citing Idaho's Appellant's Brief or its filings before 
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the District Court, but by citing the District Court's summary ofidaho's participation with other 
Non-Settling States in briefing to the arbitrators before they issued the Partial Award: 
Idaho asserted that the arbitration Panel for the NPM Adjustment 
dispute lacked jurisdiction to enter the provisions of the Settlement 
Award that addressed post-2003 NPM Adjustments: i.e., the provi-
sions that implemented the settlement's terms governing the 
amount and mechanism of certain monetary payments for post-
2003-NPM Adjustment as among the Settling Parties. See id. 
[Order Denying Vacatur at 1-2; R., pp. 485-86]. 
OPMs' Brief, p. 1 (italics in original). 
The Non-Settling States' briefing before the arbitrators issued the Partial Award did not 
anticipate (nor could it have) Idaho's position on appeal before this Court; the OPMs' summary 
of that briefing thus misstates Idaho's argument on appeal, namely: The arbitrators (1) had no 
power to determine whether the Term Sheet's post-2003 provisions affected Idaho and whether 
its post-2003 provisions altered Idaho's rights under the MSA, and (2) had no power to use the 
Term Sheet, not the MSA, to prohibit Idaho from sharing in releases of post-2003 NPM 
Adjustment funds from the Disputed Payments Account (DPA) pursuant to the MSA. Idaho does 
not claim rights under the Term Sheet, nor does Idaho argue that the District Court should vacate 
settlement terms incorporated into the Partial Award that affect only the Term Sheet parties. 
Idaho does argue, however, that Idaho and other similarly situated States did not agree to the 
arbitrators' deciding (and thus the arbitrators had no power to decide) whether the Term Sheet 
affected those States' contract rights under the MSA for post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds in the 
DPA. 
The OPMs state that the arbitrators concluded "that the challenged provisions concerning 
the Settling Parties' post-2003 payments under the settlement do not impose any cognizable in-
jury on Idaho :s recovery of its potential share of the post-2003 payments under the MSA." 
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OPMs' Brief, p. 2 (italics in original). That is the problem in a nutshell. Idaho never gave the 
arbitrators power to decide any issues of Idaho's rights under the MSA regarding post-2003 NPM 
Adjustment matters. That is why Idaho moved to vacate in part as to Idaho. 
Thus, the issue before the District Court was not whether "Idaho has [a] right under the 
MSA to the [Term Sheet] States' released funds." OPMs' Brief, p. 2. Idaho has never claimed a 
right to the Term Sheet States' released funds. Idaho does claim a right to vacate the Partial 
Award's selective release of funds to some States and not to others as contrary to or not author-
ized by the MSA, particularly because Idaho never gave the arbitrators power to rule whether the 
MSA allowed selective release of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds that excluded Idaho. 
Idaho does not "claim[] that it was 'harmed' because the Panel refused to provide it with 
the benefits of a settlement that it refused to join." OPMs' Brief, p. 2. This is a canard. Idaho 
contends that the Partial Award adopted the Term Sheet's use of post-2003 NPM Adjustment 
DPA funds in a manner that required the arbitrators to determine Idaho's rights under the MSA 
regarding post-2003 funds, an issue that Idaho never agreed to submit to the arbitrators. 
The OPMs say that "the MSA ... unquestionably does allow 'selective releases' from the 
escrow account when only some parties settle. See Vacatur Order at 6-7, R., pp. 490-91." 
OPMs' Brief, pp. 2-3. The OPMs do not cite the MSA itself for this "unquestionable" 
proposition, but the District Comi's quotations from the Partial Award's self-aggrandizing claim 
of arbitral power. Again, that is the problem to which Idaho' Motion to Vacate in Part is directed: 
The arbitrators decided issues whether the Term Sheet affected Idaho's rights under the MSA 
to release of post-2003 funds in the DPA and whether the MSA permits selective releases of post-
2003 funds from the DPA - that Idaho did not contract for the arbitrators to decide. Under 
MSA § VII( a), R., pp. 1055-1056, App., p. 6, those issues were for Idaho's MSA Court (the 
District Court in Ada County) to decide, not for the arbitrators to decide. 
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B. REPLY TO THE OPMs' COlJRSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS & STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The OPMs are correct that under the MSA,first, the maximum NPM Adjustment amount 
that a State can recover from the DPA is its own Allocable Share, 1 and, second, PMs that paid 
into the DPA have a right of first recovery from the DPA unless they do not receive their full 
NPM Adjustment. OPMs' Brief, pp. 5-6. These observations, however, are irrelevant to this 
appeal. 
Idaho's appeal is not about the sufficiency of the funds left in the DPA for years after 
2003. Nor does Idaho contend that it will have a right of first recovery from the DPA for post-
2003 years, although Idaho may be entitled to some funds from the DPA depending upon the 
Allocable Shares of States not subject to the NPM Adjustment. Both issues are beside the point. 
Idaho does contend that the arbitrators had no power to rule whether Idaho had a right under the 
MSA to lay claim to its Allocable Share of the post-2003 funds in the DPA when the PMs and the 
Term Sheet States divvied up and released the Term Sheet States' Allocable Shares of those 
funds in the DPA. It is the arbitrators' assumption of power to forbid post-2003 NPM 
Adjustment funds in the DPA from being released to Non-Settling States and whether their 
exercise of that power was consistent with the MSA with regard of Idaho - not the eventual 
availability of Idaho's Allocable Share of those funds - that is the crux of Idaho's Motion and 
this appeal. 
The OPMs say that leaving post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds in the DPAprotects Idaho: 
Thus, contrary to Idaho's suggestion ... the Settlement Award's in-
structions to the Auditor that the Non-Signatory States' potential 
share of the DPA funds should remain in the DPA was not intended 
to displace Idaho's rights under the MSA, but rather to protect 
them - by ensuring that the Term Sheet's release of the Signatory 
States' potential share of the DPA funds would not impair the Non-
The State's allocable share of funds in the DPA can include both principal and earnings. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 4 
Signatory States' ability to recover their potential share of the DPA 
funds under the MSA. 
OPMs' Brief, p. 9 (italics in original). The OPMs repeat their "protection" theory at page 11. 
What protection? The OPMs do not explain how withholding funds from Idaho "pro-
tects" Idaho more than releasing funds to Idaho as provided by the MSA. Idaho does not need to 
be '·protected" from receiving funds now rather than years down the road. This is another red 
herring; the issue is not whether the Partial Award "protected" Idaho, but whether portions of the 
Partial Award decided issues not within the arbitrators' powers and contrary to the MSA. 
Under "First" on pages 10-11 the OPMs recite what the arbitrators said about their own 
powers. But the arbitrators' own determination of their powers does not make their determina-
tion accurate, just circuitous, particularly when this Court has free review of whether an issue 
was subject to arbitration. See authorities cited in Appellant's Brief, p. 16, Standards of Review. 
The OPMs recite that the arbitrators said that they were "just giving effect to the Settling 
Parties' agreed settlement payments as among themselves." Partial Award, , I.7, R., p. 335, 
quoted at OPM Brief, p. 10. But Idaho has shown with particularity, App.Br., p. 13, that the 
Partial Award did more than just give effect to the Term Sheet among the settling parties; the 
Partial Award affirmatively directed the release and retention of post-2003 NPM Adjustment 
funds in the DPA based upon the Term Sheet's provisions and not upon the MSA's provisions in 
a manner that prohibited releases to Idaho and similarly situated States. 
In "Second' at page 11 the OPMs contend that the arbitrators "held that the release ... of 
the DPA funds ... was proper under ... MSA § XI(f)(2) and § XI(i), because the settlement re-
solved with finality the dispute over those funds given that the PMs have waived their right to 
those funds for the Signatory States." (Internal punctuation omitted.) When the arbitrators cited 
MSA § XI(£)(2) and § XI(i) in Partial Award, 1 V.4, DPA, R., p. 343, they said nothing about 
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"finality" under these two MSA sections. 2 But even if the arbitrators had found "finality" under 
MSA § XI(f)(2) and § Xl(i), it is clear that Idaho had not contracted for the arbitrators to make 
findings of "finality" on post-2003 NPM Adjustment issues affecting Idaho. 
The OPMs state that Idaho has "drastically narrow[ ed] the scope of its requested relief," 
OPMs' Brief~ p. 2, and that Idaho's Motion in the District Court "sought vacatur of all of the 
Settlement Award's post-2003 provisions" including, 
vacatur of post-2003 provisions that had nothing to do with the 
DPA ... : e.g., the credits from the Signatory States' annual pay-
ments that the PMs receive for the 2004-2014 NPM Adjustments; 
the automatic adjustment amounts that the Signatory States provide 
to the PMs for the post-2014 NPM Adjustments; and the reim-
bursements that the PMs provide to the Signatory States for the 
post-2014 NPM Adjustments. 
OPMs' Brief, pp. 12-13. 
The OPMs' position that Idaho's Motion sought to undo post-2003 provisions of the 
Partial Award that did not affect Idaho might be plausible if the Motion were read in isolation. 
But, Idaho's Memorandum in Support of its Motion clarified that Idaho sought only to vacate as 
to Idaho the Partial Award's provisions regarding release of post-2003 DPA funds: 
2 The Partial Award said the following in the only paragraph citing these two MSA sections: 
DPA. It is undisputed that, under the MSA, the PMs have the right of 
first recovery for NPM Adjustment funds in the DPA. See Order re: Transfers 
From DPA [citation omitted]; see also MSA §§ Xl(t)(2), XI(i)(l)(B). Under the 
Term Sheet, the PMs have waived that right for the Signatory States, allowing 
the Signatory States to recover their Allocable Share of those DPA funds. See 
Term Sheet Appendix~~ 5-6. 
Partial Award,~ V.4, DPA; R., p. 343, citing to Appendix, R., pp. 362-363. 
The Partial Award earlier said: "This Stipulated Partial Settlement and Award ... resolves with 
finality the Settling Parties' dispute concerning the 2003 NPM Adjustment and certain subsequent years 
as to limited issues ... ," Partial Award,~ 11.1, R., p. 336, but the Partial Award said nothing about "final-
ity" under MSA § XI(f)(2) and § XI(i). The OPMs may be trying to bootstrap the Partial Award into a 
determination of "finality" under MSA § Xl(f)(2) and § Xl(i) because Part IV.B of the Appellant's Brief, 
pp. 31-34, focuses on the lack of finality under those MSA sections. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF- 6 
[The District Court] ordered Idaho and the PMs to arbitrate 
the 2003 NPM Adjustment in a unitary proceeding ... that "must 
be decided with regard to each and every State." ... The [arbitra-
tors] did not do that in at least two regards. First, the [arbitrators] 
issued a Partial Award that addressed issues beyond the 2003 NPM 
Adjustment and ordered release of funds associated with NPM Ad-
justments for later years. Second, the [arbitrators] exempted [the 
Term Sheet States] from the uniform application of the MSA con-
tract standards for the 2003 NPM Adjustment . . . . Idaho~ Motion 
to Vacate deals only with the first concern . . . . 
Accordingly, all portions of the Partial Award addressing 
DPA funds not associated with the 2003 NPM Adjustment should 
be vacated with regard to Idaho as beyond the Panel's jurisdiction 
and authority. 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Vacate in Part Etc.; R., pp. 392-393 (emphasis added). 
Idaho was simply asking (and still simply asks) that it not be bound by the Partial Award's provi-
sions for post-2003 funds in the DPA. 
Further, even if Idaho had raised issues before the District Court that it did not pursue on 
appeal, that would be irrelevant. Litigants often narrow issues on appeal from those pursued 
below, and appellate courts generally appreciate a narrowing of the issues. The statement that 
Idaho sought more below than before this Court is another red herring. 
The OPMs say that it is "of particular relevance here [that] Idaho did not seek vacatur of 
the Settlement Award's ... selectively releasing ... 2003 NPM Adjustment funds in the DPA ... 
[as] contrary to the MSA [or] prejudicial to the Non-Signatory States." OPMs' Brief, p. 13 
(italics in original).3 The OPMs do not explain why Idaho's pursuit of post-2003 issues rather 
3 The OPMs also stated earlier in their brief that Idaho did not challenge the selective release of 2003 
NPM Adjustment Funds: "Indeed, the Panel's interpretation of the MSA in this regard applied equally to 
the selective release of 2003 NPM Adjustment funds, ... which Idaho has not even challenged here .... " 
OPMs' Brief, p. 3 (italics in original). The comments above also apply to these comments on page 3. 
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than including 2003 issues is "of particular relevance." Idaho's decision is easily explained. 
Idaho believes that the Partial Award's selective release of 2003 NPM Adjustment funds 
to the Term Sheet States before uncontested States like Idaho received their withheld NPM Ad-
justment funds was contrary to the MSA and prejudicial to Idaho. However, Idaho did not 
pursue 2003 issues for at least two reasons. First, as a practical matter the 2003 NPM Adjust-
ment payment issues for Idaho would (and did) resolve themselves when Idaho received its share 
of the withheld 2003 NPM Adjustment funds in the April 2014 payments. The harm of waiting 
an additional twelve months for 2003 NPM Adjustment funds is much different in degree than 
the harm of waiting many more years for funds for future NPM Adjustments. Second, the 
Agreement Regarding Arbitration (ARA) for the 2003 NPM Adjustment may have put a gloss on 
the arbitrators' powers over 2003 funds, see R., pp. 1356-1368; their absence of powers over 
post-2003 funds is a cleaner issue to explain. Idaho focused its Motion on what was more 
important over the long run: the arbitrators' extra-contractual enlargement of their powers as to 
Idaho to claim authority over release of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds through 2012 and the 
precedential effects of such extra-jurisdictional rulings. 
C. REPLY TO THE SPMs' NATURE OF THE CASE 
Most of the SPMs' Nature of the Case, SPMs' Brief, pp. 1-3, does not cite the Appellate 
Record. Regardless, Idaho has no quarrel with the SP Ms' description of themselves. Id., p. 1. 
The SPMs parrot the OPMs that the "only right that the MSA gives Idaho with respect to 
the DPA is the right to recover its own Allocable Share of the funds in the DPA if it is found to 
be entitled to such funds after a 'final determination' for the year in question." SPMs' Brief, p. 2 
(bolding and italics in original). Idaho can say the same thing about the PMs and the Term Sheet 
States: Their only right to recover post-2003 funds from the DPA under the MSA is after a final 
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determination for the years in question. No final determinations have yet been made under the 
MSA. Idaho's point is that the PMs may release DPA funds to all of the States whenever they 
wish, but under the MSA they cannot pick and choose which States get released funds before a 
final determination, and the arbitrators for the 2003 NPM Adjustment had no power to revise the 
MSA to selectively release funds for years after 2003. 
D. REPLY TO THE SPMS' COURSE OF THE PROCEEDING & STATE'.\1ENT OF THE FACTS 
Like the OPMs, the SPMs assure this Court that the retention of post-2003 NPM Adjust-
ment funds in the DPA "protected Idaho." SPMs' Brief, p. 4 (bolding and italics in original). 
Like the OPMs, the SPMs do not articulate how Idaho has been "protected." "Protection" from 
receiving post-2003 funds is "protection" that Idaho neither wants nor seeks. 
ARGUMENT 
I. IDAHO HAS STANDING TO SEEK VACATUR IN PART 
The PMs urge this Court to repeat the District Court's order of analysis - merits before 
standing - and to conclude that Idaho has no standing because they contend that Idaho has no 
"cognizable injury," i.e., Idaho will lose on the merits. However, this Court's precedents are 
clear that a legal analysis of the merits - what the PMs call determination of whether there is a 
"cognizable injury" comes after a standing analysis and does not precede it. 
A. Reply to the OPMs' Standing Argument 
The PMs persuaded the District Court to use an analytical framework not found in Idaho 
standing law: A litigant must show "legal prejudice" or a "cognizable injury" to have standing 
rather than merely show an injury in fact. Memorandum Decision, R., pp. 490-491 (Idaho had 
no standing because it could not show "legal prejudice" or "cognizable injury"). The OPMs take 
the same approach here - arguing that Idaho must show "cognizable injury" to have standing: 
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The District Court held that Idaho must demonstrate a cog-
nizable injury in order to establish its standing ... , and the [District 
Court] further held that Idaho had failed to show any such injury. 
On appeal, the State essentially concedes the first holding, and its 
attack on the second holding is limited and meritless. 
OPMs' Brief, p. 14. 
Idaho does not concede that a litigant must show cognizable injury to have standing. The 
cases cited in App. Br., pp. 18-19, show that neither "legal prejudice" nor "cognizable injury" is 
an element of Idaho standing law. 4 Idaho's argument was and is that it has standing because it 
had an injury in fact, namely, the arbitrators directed, pursuant to the Term Sheet and contrary to 
the MSA, that the PMs and Term Sheet States would receive distribution of post-2003 NPM 
Adjustments funds from the DPA, but Idaho and other States would not. App. Br., pp. 18-19. 
These are "facts on the ground" constituting "injury in fact" that give Idaho standing to take the 
next step: arguing that these facts allow Idaho to show how the Partial Award exceeded the 
arbitrators' powers and violated Idaho's MSA contract rights. 
Young v. City c~f Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 44 P.3d 1157 (2002), which the District Court 
cited for Idaho standing law, neither refers to "cognizable injury" nor to "legal prejudice" when 
determining standing; it refers only to injury in fact. Under Idaho standing law the legal validity 
of a claim (i.e., whether there is a legally cognizable injury) is immaterial; the standing inquiry 
asks only whether a litigant has alleged an injury in fact fairly traceable to the conduct at issue 
that is likely to be redressed by judicial relief. E.g., Arambarri v. Armstrong, 152 Idaho 734, 
738-740, 274 P.3d 1249, 1253-1255 (2012) (plaintiff with no legally cognizable injury still had 
standing to sue). Any other result would conflate the standing component of jurisdiction with the 
4 Idaho appellate decisions refer to "cognizable" claims or injuries in connection with the merits, not 
in connection with whether there is an injury in fact that will confer standing. E.g., State v. Hamlin, 156 
Idaho 307,316,324 P.3d 1006, 1015 (Ct.App. 2014) (deciding whether criminal defendant had stated a 
"cognizable equal protection claim" on the merits). 
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merits. E.g., Lexmark Intern., Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. n.4, 134 
S.Ct. 1377, 1388, n.4 (2014) (the absence of a valid cause of action, as opposed to an arguable 
cause of action, does not implicate jurisdictional analyses like standing). 
The OPMs state the general rule that a non-settling party has no standing to object to a 
settlement between other parties. OPMs' Brief, pp. 15-16. Idaho agrees with this general rule. 
But Idaho is not objecting to the PMs' settlement with the Term Sheet States; Idaho is objecting 
to the arbitrators' exercising extra-jurisdictional power to decide (and wrongly at that) that Idaho 
was not affected by the Term Sheet's provisions preventing Idaho from sharing in post-2003 DPA 
releases. None of the OPMs' cases applies to this appeal's facts. Idaho examines them in turn. 
Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Public Schools, 668 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 2012), held the general rule 
that a non-settling party has no standing to object to a settlement among other parties did not 
apply to its facts and that a non-settling party could challenge a settlement because part of the 
settlement bound a settling party (the Department of Public Instruction (DPT)) to take action 
against a non-settling party (Milwaukee Public Schools (MPS)). Jamie S. stated that a settlement 
cannot "requir[e] more of MPS than Wisconsin law permits DPI to impose." Id. at 501-502. 
Putting aside the fact that Idaho is not challenging a settlement, but is challenging the 
arbitrators' imposition of certain settlement terms upon Idaho, Jamie S. is instructive. Analogous 
to the settlement in Jamie S., the Partial Award imposed upon Idaho, a Non-Settling State, Term 
Sheet provisions that Idaho did not agree to, i.e., those that prevented distribution of post-2003 
DPA funds to Non-Settling States, and displaced the MSA, which controls distributions from the 
DPA. Like the Milwaukee School District in Jamie S., Idaho has a right to be governed by the 
applicable law (the MSA itself) and not by a settlement that it did not sign. 
In re Integra Realty Resources, Inc., 262 F.3d 1089 (10th Cir. 2001 ), addressed defendant 
class members' rights to opt out of a settlement and whether they had standing to challenge the 
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settlement by remaining class defendants. The challengers were not, as is Idaho here, claiming 
that the settlement denied them a contract right. But Integra recognized that parties opposing a 
settlement would have standing to pursue a claim "of interference with a party's contract rights." 
Id. at 1102, citing Agretti v. ANR Freight System, Inc., 982 F.2d 242,247 (7th Cir. 1992). Idaho's 
Motion to Vacate in Part is based upon the arbitrators' denial of Idaho's asserted contract rights 
under the MSA, not upon a challenge to a settlement among other parties. Idaho has standing. 
State v. Continental Cas. Co., 126 Idaho 178,879 P.2d 1111 (1994), involved the State's 
claims against two insurers. The standing issue was whether one insurer could challenge the 
State's settlement with the other insurer. The Court held that there was no injury to one insurer 
from the other's settlement because each insurer's liability was capped, so one had no standing to 
challenge the other's settlement where the State, not the other insurer, would bear any deficiency 
(i.e., one insurer's settlement terms were not imposed upon the other). Id. at 186, 879 P.2d at 
1122. Continental does not apply here. Idaho is not challenging the PMs' settlement with some 
States; Idaho is challenging the arbitrators' use of the Term Sheet rather than the MSA to govern 
release of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds. 
The OPMs say that Idaho "abandoned" what they call Idaho's "unsuccessful argument 
below that injury is unnecessary to establish standing where the particular claim presented hap-
pens to be a jurisdictional objection to an arbitration award." OPMs' Brief, p. 16. Idaho has not 
abandoned that argument. Part III of Idaho's Argument "Under the FAA's Plain Language, 
Idaho Need Not Show Actual Harm to Vacate in Part an Award That Exceeded the Arbitrators' 
Powers With Regard to Idaho and/or Awarded on a Matter Not Submitted to the Arbitrators," 
App. Br., pp. 25-27 - preserves the argument that arbitrators who rule on issues over which they 
have no power prejudice the litigant by depriving the litigant of the right to pursue the issue in a 
forum that does have jurisdiction to rule. The arbitrators' deciding an issue that they had no 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 12 
power to rule on is an injury in fact in and of itself. But Idaho does not rest upon that position 
alone. Idaho also identifies the additional injury in fact that post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds 
were not released to it, but should have been under MSA provisions that the arbitrators displaced 
with the Term Sheet. That is also sufficient injury in fact to confer standing. 
The OPMs begin Part I.B of their argument by again accusing Idaho of "expressly aban-
don[ing] almost all of the relief that it originally sought in its vacatur motion." OPMs' Brief, 
p. 17. Idaho earlier debunked the contention that it ever sought to unwind payments to Term 
Sheet States. It did not. See pp. 6-7, supra. It need not do so again. 
The OPMs cite the District Court's legal conclusion that selective release of post-2003 
DPA funds is not a cognizable injury under the MSA to bolster their position that Idaho does not 
have standing. OPMs' Brief, p. 18. That reintroduces the error that the OPMs foisted upon the 
District Court - that Idaho does not have standing because the OPMs say that Idaho cannot 
prevail on the merits. The OPMs also cite the arbitrators' legal conclusions that the Term Sheet 
and the Partial Award had no effect upon States like Idaho. Id. That compounds the problem 
because Idaho never agreed to give the arbitrators power to decide whether the Term Sheet 
affected Idaho. 
The OPMs next introduce a concept of piecemeal finality for purposes of release of funds 
under the MSA: 
Thus, contrary to the State's assertion that the Panel "dis-
placed the MSA" with the Term Sheet when it upheld selectivity of 
the post-settlement DPA releases ... , the Panel in actuality inter-
preted the MSA's DPA provisions to allow selectively releasing 
DPA funds in light of the partial settlement. And, tellingly, Idaho's 
brief does not address, let alone refute, the Panel's interpretation 
that the partial settlement limited waiver of the PMs' right of first 
recovery from the DPA created "finality" for the Signatory States. 
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OPMs' Brief, p. 19. Again, the OPMs have identified the problem and not answered it. Idaho 
never contracted for the arbitrators to decide what the MSA meant for post-2003 NPM Adjust-
ment funds, whether there was finality for some States but not for Idaho, or other post-2003 
issues. The arbitrators' Partial Award deciding post-2003 issues that Idaho never submitted to 
them is injury in fact, both procedurally and on the merits. 
The OPMs cite the Colorado MSA Court's bench remarks that a settlement can be a final 
determination under the MSA. 5 R., p. 1837, Tr., p. 118, lines 16-22, cited at OPMs' Brief, p. 19. 
But the remarks on that page of the transcript addressed releases of 2003 NPM Adjustment 
funds; the Colorado MSA Court distinguished between 2003 and post-2003 releases as follows: 
Now we get to the issue of the post-2003 disputed payment 
account releases. And that's, to me, a closer question. In other 
words, as part of this settlement that the settling states entered into, 
the arbitration award directs the independent auditor to go ahead 
and make payments in resolution of the post-2003 disputed funds. 
The panel held that that that its ruling with respect to 
that was integral to the 2003 dispute and found that it, therefore, 
had the jurisdiction to direct the release of those funds. That's one 
that I think may have legs when we get to a full-on determination 
of the vacatur motion. 
Colorado MSA Court Transcript, p. 119, line 14 p. 120, line 1; R., p. 183 7. Ruling on issues of 
post-2003 distributions is a dispute that does "have legs'' here because Idaho did not grant the 
arbitrators power to decide those issues with regard to Idaho. 
The OPMs return to the absence of an Idaho challenge to release of 2003 NPM Adjust-
ment funds as reason to deny Idaho's challenge to release of post-2003 funds: "Idaho's lack of 
The OPMs' parenthetical summarizing the Colorado MSA Court's remarks says: "('essentially 
agree[ing]' that 'a settlement' can be 'a final determination under [the] MSA['s DPA provisions]."' 
OPMs' Brief, p. 19. But nothing in the paragraph from which this quote is taken refers to the MSA's 
DPA provisions. See Colorado MSA Court Transcript, p. 118, lines 19-20; R., p. 183 7. 
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cognizable injury from the Panel's ruling upholding the selectivity of the post-2003 DPA releases 
is especially clear because the very same ruling also upheld the selectivity of the 2003 DPA 
releases, and that application of the ruling is unchallenged by Idaho .... " OPMs' Brief, p. 20. 
Idaho explained why it did not challenge the 2003 distributions, supra at p. 8. Idaho's practical 
decision to marshal its resources to challenge post-2003 releases and not to challenge 2003 
releases has no bearing on the merits of Idaho's position on post-2003 releases and says nothing 
about the extra-jurisdictional nature of the post-2003 rulings and releases. 
The OPMs further contend that Idaho cannot establish standing "based upon a hypotheti-
cal legal injury," citing Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127, 1137-1138 (10th Cir. 2007), and Troutner v. 
Kempthorne, 142 Idaho 389, 390-391, 128 P.3d 926, 927-930 (2006), from which they conclude 
that "Idaho itself effectively concedes that its standing ... turns on the distinct legal question 
whether selectively releasing DPA funds is prohibited under the DPA provisions in MSA 
§X!(/)(2) and §Xl(i)." OPMs' Brief, p. 21 (italics in original). Idaho disagrees; it claims 
standing based upon an injury in fact selective release of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds in 
the DPA. Further, there is nothing hypothetical about Idaho's legal theories that the Idaho MSA 
court was the proper forum to resolve the contract issues regarding whether the MSA entitles 
Idaho to post-2003 DPA releases, see MSA § VII(a), R. pp. 1055-1056, App. p. 6, or that those 
releases contravened the MSA. 
Day does not support the OPMs' position that Idaho lacks standing because the OPMs 
contend that Idaho's Motion is based upon what they call a "hypothetical legal injury." In Day, 
students who did not qualify for in-State tuition at Kansas colleges challenged a Kansas statute 
permitting students who attended high school in Kansas but who were not legally in the United 
States to qualify for in-State tuition. 500 F.3d at 1130-1131. The Day plaintiffs' standing found-
ered on a lack of causation and a lack of redressability. Day held that some of plaintiffs' theories 
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were hypothetical and did not support the causal-connection element of standing because they 
required speculation about how tuition was set and did not connect plaintiffs' own tuition to 
tuition charged to others, i.e., plaintiffs' position that increasing tuition for other students would 
reduce tuition for them was based upon a hypothetical theory not based on actual tuition-setting 
practices. Id. at 1133-1134. 
Day did not say that it was ordinarily necessary to evaluate a plaintiff's legal theories to 
determine standing; it said just the opposite is the normal practice: "[W]e assume, during the 
evaluation of the plaintiff's standing, that the plaintiff will prevail on his merits argument that 
is, that the defendant has violated the law." Id. at 1138 (citation omitted). Applying this prin-
ciple to this appeal, when Idaho identified its injury in fact of selective release of post-2003 DPA 
funds by arbitrators without power to issue such a ruling, the Court must assume for purposes of 
its standing analysis that the Paiiial Award's selective release of post-2003 funds was beyond the 
arbitrators' powers and displaced and was contrary to the MSA. 
Day'.\· reference to not assuming jurisdiction based upon a hypothetical legal injury was 
narrow and does not apply here. Day had to determine whether a Federal statute upon which 
plaintiffs based their legal arguments of Federal pre-emption created a private right of action. 
The statute did not, which made redress of the claimed injury impossible, so the plaintiffs had no 
standing based upon the absence of available redress under their legal theory. Id. at 113 7-1139. 
Nothing similar is present here. Idaho's legal theories allow for redress by partial vacatur of the 
arbitrators' Partial Award and the release of DPA funds. 
In Troutner the plaintiffs contended that the Idaho Judicial Council was improperly con-
stituted as having more than three members from one political party that was not their own party 
and asked that a specific member of the alleged supermajority party be removed from office. 
The Court held that plaintiffs did not have standing because they presented a generalized 
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gnevance (they were affected like any other citizen) and because their grievance was not 
redressable (the Governor would not be under any legal obligation to appoint a member of 
plaintiffs' party to the Council). Id. at 392-393, 128 P.3d at 926-929. Troutner does not require a 
plaintiff who has a distinct, palpable, redressable personal injury to also prove that the plaintiff 
wil 1 prevail on the merits in order to have standing. 
The OPMs contend that Idaho's "sole argument for vacating the post-2003 DPA ruling on 
jurisdictional grounds ... is that the State will then be able to receive its post-2003 funds from 
the DPA because that is what the MSA provides." OPMs' Brief, pp. 21-22. That is not Idaho's 
sole argument. That is Idaho's goal and one of its arguments on the merits, but another one of 
Idaho's arguments for Partial Vacatur is that it need only show that the arbitrators exceeded their 
powers as to Idaho and/or awarded on a matter not submitted to them by Idaho in order to vacate 
in part the Partial Award so that Idaho can pursue its argument in the Idaho MSA Court, which 
does have jurisdiction over the issue of whether the Term Sheet amended the MSA in a manner 
affecting Idaho. See App. Br., Argument Part III, pp. 25-27. That is enough to confer standing. 
B. Reply to the SPMs' Standing Argument 
The SPMs' arguments on standing do not substantively differ from the OPMs' arguments. 
Idaho adopts its Reply to the OPMs' standing arguments as its Reply to the SPMs' arguments and 
adds these few additional comments. 
Idaho disagrees that is has no injury when its share of the NPM Adjustment funds remain 
in the DPA and disagrees that Idaho is "protected" by not receiving its money now. SPMs' Brief, 
pp. 5-6. The PMs and the Term Sheet States received benefits by release of DPA funds before a 
final determination of the disputes for which funds were placed in the Disputed Payments Ac-
count. Because DPA funds for certain post-2003 years were released to other MSA parties, Idaho 
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is entitled to a release, too, as required by the MSA. 
As for whether Idaho was the object of the challenged conduct, SPMs' Brief, p. 6, it was. 
The Partial Award prohibited Idaho (and similarly situated States) from receiving funds from the 
DPA. See Partial Award, ~1 III.1-III.5; R., pp. 337-339, excerpted at App. Br., p. 12. 
* * * 
In sum, Idaho has standing. The District Court mistakenly held that Idaho must show 
success on the merits to have standing. That is not the law of Idaho. The District Court's dis-
missal of Idaho's Motion to Vacate in Part for lack of standing should be reversed. 
II. THE ARBITRATORS EXCEEDED THEIR POWERS AND/OR AWARDED ON 
MATTERS NOT SUBMITTED TO THEM WITH REGARD TO IDAHO; THE 
PARTIAL AWARD SHOULD BE VACATED OR MODIFIED IN PART AS TO IDAHO 
Idaho argued the merits of its appeal as follows: (1) The applicable statutes provide that 
the District Court may vacate or modify an arbitrators' award when the arbitrators exceeded their 
powers or awarded upon matters not submitted to them, App.Br., pp. 20-25; (2) under the statutes 
arbitrators' exercise of "extra-jurisdictional" power is sufficient, as to Idaho, to vacate the Partial 
Award's terms prohibiting Idaho from receiving its Allocable Share of releases of post-2003 
NPM Adjustment funds in the DPA, id., at 25-27; and (3) selective release of post-2003 NPM 
Adjustment funds in the DPA displaced and was contrary to the MSA and must be vacated as 
beyond the arbitrators' powers, id. at 27-34. 
Idaho continues to believe that this is the logical sequence for presenting its argument. 
The PMs avoid the statutory language arguments altogether; neither the OPMs' Brief nor the 
SPMs' Brief cite the Federal or Idaho Arbitration Acts' language on vacatur or modification of 
awards. Thus, Idaho will not repeat its arguments based upon the language of the statutes. 
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A. Reply to the OPMs' Arguments on the Arbitrators' Powers 
The OPMs cite Int'! Assoc. of Firefighters, Local No. 672 v. City qf Boise, 136 Idaho 162, 
168, 30 P.3d 940, 946 (200 I), OP Ms' Brief, p. 22, for the proposition that there must be positive 
assurance that an arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted 
dispute. Idaho can give that positive assurance. The Agreement Regarding Arbitration (ARA) 
covered the 2003 NPM Adjustment and no other year. R., pp. 1356-1368. The OPMs have not 
cited anything in the ARA or the MSA giving 2003 NPM Adjustment arbitrators power over 
post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds or their release. Idaho never agreed to give the arbitrators 
power over funds in the DPA for years after 2003. The PMs do not cite any provisions in the 
documents governing the 2003 NPM Adjustment arbitration in which Idaho agreed to give the 
arbitrators power over any post-2003 issues regarding Idaho. Their silence is telling. 
The Pennsylvania and Missouri MSA Court orders that vacated the arbitrators' awards for 
those States belie the arbitrators' statement they had authority over "all issues related to the 2003 
NPM Adjustment dispute," Partial Award, p. 2; R., p. 333 (internal punctuation omitted), quoted 
OPMs' Brief, p. 22. The best that the OPMs offer is to rely upon the arbitrators' own assessment 
of their powers. OPMs' Brief, pp. 22-23. Assuming that the arbitrators had power to rule upon 
all aspects of the Term Sheet as between the Term Sheet parties, no case cited by the arbitrators 
(and in turn cited by the OPMs) supports the arbitrators' assertion of authority over Idaho and 




The five cases at OPMs' Brief, p. 23, are: 
Ross Bros. Constr. Co. v. Int'! Steel Serv., 283 F.3d 867 (7th Cir. 2002). This case held that under 
Pennsylvania law third party beneficiaries of contracts with arbitration clauses may enforce arbi-
tration clauses and may be forced to abide by arbitration clauses. Id. at 875. Idaho was not a third 
party beneficiary of the Term Sheet. Ross Bros. does not apply to the circumstances here. 
United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Ind. & Serv. Workers Int'! 
Union v. TriMas Corp., 531 F.3d 531 (7th Cir. 2008). This case held that a labor-management 
agreement concerning arbitration of disputes over union organizing efforts was enforceable against 
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Rather than allow the MSA itself to operate with regard to those DPA funds, the arbitrators 
subjected Idaho and similarly situated States to the Term Sheet's provisions prohibiting distribu-
tions of their Allocable Shares of funds in the DPA. 
The arbitrators were not "just giving effect to the Settling Parties' agreed settlement pay-
ments as among themselves." OPMs' Brief, p. 23, quoting Partial Award, 11.7, R., p. 335. De-
spite their protestations, the arbitrators were "rendering it [the Term Sheet) binding on absent 
after-acquired businesses (and their subsidiaries) of the investment banking firm that signed the 
agreement to arbitrate. The obligation to arbitrate was based upon tracing privity of contract or 
ownership from the firm that signed the arbitration agreement to the after-acquired plant at issue. 
Idaho is not similarly situated; it was not "acquired" by the PMs or by the Term Sheet States. 
• Abramson v. Pennwood Inv. Corp., 392 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1968). This case held that a class mem-
ber in a shareholders' derivative suit in State Court was bound by a settlement approved by a State 
Court that released both State and Federal claims. No arbitration was involved. The Federal suit 
was barred because the plaintiff was a party to the State Court settlement as a member of the class. 
Abramson stands for the proposition that adjudicators may entertain a settlement that goes beyond 
the issues before them, but it does not stand for the proposition that the 2003 NPM Adjustment 
arbitrators could impose upon Idaho terms of a settlement to which Idaho was not a party. 
• Nottingham Partners v. Trans-Lux Cmp., 925 F.2d 29 ( I st Cir. 1991 ). This case is like Abramson; 
it bound class members in a State Court settlement to a settlement's release of both State and Fed-
eral claims. Like Abramson, it has no application to this appeal. No arbitration was involved. 
• Stolt-Nielsen SA v. Anima/Feeds Int'/ Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 130 S.Ct. 1758 (2010). This case said: 
In certain contexts, it is appropriate to presume that parties that enter into an arbitra-
tion agreement implicitly authorize the arbitrator to adopt such procedures as are necessary 
to give effect to the parties' agreement. . . . This recognition is grounded in the background 
principle that when the parties to a bargain sufficiently defined to be a contract have not 
agreed with respect to a term which is essential to a determination of their rights and duties, 
a term which is reasonable in the circumstances is supplied by the court. 
Id. at 685, 130 S.Ct. at 1775 ( citations and internal punctuation omitted). However, Stolt-Nielsen 
declined to imply that class action procedures were part of the implicit procedures for arbitration of 
disputes. Id. at 685-687, 130 S.Ct. at 1775-1776. Likewise, it is a leap to assume that the MSA 
and the Agreement Regarding Arbitration for the 2003 NPM Adjustment implicitly gave the arbi-
trators authority to forbid release of Idaho's Allocable Shares of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds 
in the DPA as a means of effectuating a settlement that did not exist when the arbitration began. 
In summary, not one of the cases cited by the arbitrators (and in turn cited by the OPMs) supports the 
arbitrators' assertion of power over Idaho's Allocable Share of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds in the 
DPA. 
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class members" (i.e., the States that did not settle), id., by directing (pursuant to the Term Sheet, 
see App. Br., p. 12) that Idaho and other States would not share in distributions from the DPA 
rather than allowing the MSA to operate however it would operate. Thus, Idaho does address 
and does refute the arbitrators' rationale, despite the OPMs' statement to the contrary at page 24. 
The Court may assume arguendo that the arbitrators had to address the Term Sheet 
States' Allocable Shares of post-2003 NPM Adjustment DPA funds to implement the Term Sheet 
among its parties. Nevertheless, when the arbitrators held that the Term Sheet did not amend the 
MSA in a manner affecting non-Settling States like Idaho, and when they addressed Idaho's and 
other like States' Allocable Shares of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds, the fact is that the 
arbitrators were not implementing the Term Sheet among its parties; they were imposing the 
Term Sheet's provisions upon Non-Settling States. The only reason for the arbitrators to address 
those latter issues - particularly forbidding release of post-2003 funds to the Non-Settling 
States was to keep the Non-Settling States at bay. The arbitrators had no power to determine 
those issues, which belong in the MSA court, and they had no power to keep Non-Settling States 
at bay. MSA § VII(a) and-(c), R., pp. 1055-1056; App., p. 6. 
The OPMs argue that "Idaho expressly objected to the settlement on the ground that the 
selectivity of the 2003 DPA releases was invalid under the MSA," and having so objected, Idaho 
"effectively submitted the selective DPA release issue to the arbitrator [ and] cannot claim that the 
Panel lacked jurisdiction to rule against it on that issue." OPMs' Brief, p. 24 (internal punctua-
tion omitted). This argument is ridiculous. In essence, the OPMs say that when Idaho made a 
jurisdictional objection to what the Term Sheet parties were asking the arbitrators to do,7 Idaho 
7 Idaho was among the States that contested the arbitrators' power over post-2003 NPM Adjustment 
Funds. See R., pp. 298-301 (Idaho joined in pre-Partial Award briefing contesting the arbitrators' powers 
to issue what would become the Partial Award). 
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agreed to be bound by the arbitrators' decision regarding their powers. Idaho's objection was not 
giving the issue of the arbitrators' powers to the arbitrators; Idaho was preserving the issue for 
later District Court review on a motion to vacate or modify the arbitrators' award. As 2 DOMKE 
ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2014 on-line update) explains, some courts have held that one 
must make jurisdictional objections to the arbitrators to preserve the issue for vacatur: 
[S]ome of the grounds on which challenges to the 
award may be made can only be asserted if the party made a timely 
objection during the arbitration process. Otherwise, the claim on 
which the challenge is based may be considered as having been 
waived by the conduct of the party in participating in the arbi-
tration without raising the objection. 
DOMKE§ 38: 12 (footnote omitted). 
. . . [U]nder some statutes, the question whether the parties 
have agreed to arbitrate a dispute may be waived if a party parti-
cipates in an arbitration hearing without raising the objection. . .. 
Even absent statutory authority, a paiiy may lose the right to appeal 
certain issues if the party fails to object prior to the appeal. 
DOMKE§ 38:7 (footnotes omitted). See Garrell v. Blanton, 311 S.C. 201,428 S.E.2d 8 (Ct. App. 
1993), aff'd, 316 S.C. 186,447 S.E.2d 840 (1994) (party waived objection to arbitration by parti-
cipating in arbitration without objection); Village of Carpentersville v. Mayfair Const. Co., 100 
Ill.App.3d 128, 130-131, 426 N.E.2d 558, 56 (1981) (timely objection to arbitrability preserves 
the right to challenge the award after participating in the arbitration), cited in DOMKE § 38:7, n.6. 
Like a litigant before a trial court who raises an objection to preserve an issue for appeal, 
not to foreclose appeal, Idaho's jurisdictional objection before the arbitrators preserved Idaho's 
issue that the arbitrators acted beyond their powers and did not foreclose later review. 8 
8 The OPMs may be trying to put Idaho in a "heads-I-win-tails-you-lose" Catch 22: If Idaho objects 
to the arbitrators' assumption of powers not given to them, it agrees to be bound by their decision, but if it 
does not object, it waives its argument that they exceeded their powers. Either way, Idaho loses its right 
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B. Reply to the SPMs' Arguments on the Arbitrators' Powers 
Points (I) through (4) of the SPMs' argument on page 7 are addressed in Idaho's Reply to 
the OPMs' arguments. Idaho does not repeat its arguments here. Idaho does address the fol-
lowing SPM comments on page 7: 
. . . [T]his settlement resolved a substantial part of a hard-
fought and very lengthy battle. Permitting Idaho to upset the set-
tlement now - by receiving its benefits without joining it - flies 
in the face of the long-established policy recognized by this Court 
and others encouraging settlement as a means of resolving dis-
putes. 
Idaho does not know what the SPMs are referring to by Idaho "upset[ting] the settlement" 
and "receiving its benefits without joining it." The settlement happened. The Partial Award 
ordered $1. 7 billion dollars to be released from the DPA to the Term Sheet parties. Partial 
Award, i1 III.4(a); R., p. 338. Idaho is not asking for the settlement to be undone or for the Term 
Sheet's benefits; rather, Idaho is asking for its contract rights under the MSA. 
One of two things will happen if Idaho is allowed to address the merits of its claim that 
the MSA does not allow selective release of NPM Adjustment funds in the DPA before there is a 
final determination of which States are subject to the NPM Adjustment for 2004-2012 and which 
States are not: (1) Idaho will prevail on the merits and receive its Allocable Share of those funds, 
or (2) Idaho will not prevail and the funds will stay in the DPA. Either way, the Term Sheet 
Settlement stays in place and Idaho does not receive the Term Sheet's benefits. In particular: 
• Term Sheet States will not be subject to the PMs' diligent enforcement challenges for 
2004-2014. Idaho will be if the PMs challenge whether it diligently enforced its 
Qualifying Statute. 
• The PMs and the Term Sheet States will keep the funds released to them for 2003-2012 
to move for vacatur for arbitrators exceeding their powers or awarding on matters not submitted to them. 
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with no obligation to repay any of those funds to one another and no potential MSA 
offsets or credits against one another associated with those funds. Idaho's share of the 
funds in the DPA (indeed, Idaho's entire annual payments for future years) can continue 
to be in play for future MSA credits or offsets between Idaho and the PMs. 
• Term Sheet States will be subject to a replacement NPM Adjustment beginning in 2015. 
See Term Sheet, Part III; R., pp. 351-355. Idaho will not. 
Nothing in Idaho's Vacatur Motion, if successful, will "upset" the Term Sheet Settlement. As 
shown above, the Term Sheet will stay in place between the PMs and the Term Sheet States. 
What the Partial Award could not do, and what Idaho's Motion is designed to remedy, is 
the arbitrators' use of the Term Sheet to prevent Idaho from enjoying its MSA contract rights to 
release of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds in the DPA. Those are the only rights that Idaho is 
pursuing in its Motion. The arbitrators had no power to take those rights from Idaho. 
CONCLUSION 
As it did in its Appellant's Brief, Idaho prays that this Court: 
(a) reverse the judgment of the District Court denying the State of Idaho's Motion to 
Vacate in Part the Partial Award of the 2003 NPM Adjustment Arbitration Panel, and 
(b) remand to the District Court with instructions to grant the State of Idaho's Motion 
to Vacate in Part the Partial Award of the 2003 NPM Adjustment Arbitration Panel. In particular, 
the District Court should vacate and/or modify as to Idaho all provisions of the Partial Award that 
deny release of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds to Idaho. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of August, 2014. 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
By _____________ _ 
MICHAELS. GILMORE 
Deputy Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
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